Question: Compare and consider the High Court’s application of the implied freedom of political communication to protests outside workplaces in the cases of Brown v Tasmania and Clubb v Edwards.  What is the significance of the distinctions drawn by the Court for the enactment of future laws dealing with protests affecting workplaces?

Putting the agitator out of business: the implications of brown and clubb for the statutory protection of the workplace from protests

I Introduction

It has often been remarked that a flourishing liberal democracy must ensure for its citizens the freedom to engage in public protest.[1] In Australia, this sentiment finds expression in the courts’ recognition of protest as a form of political communication, to which a measure of protection is afforded under the Constitution.[2] However, the natural tendency for public demonstrations to confront, provoke and offend — to agitate[3] — leaves this ‘freedom to protest’ particularly susceptible to curtailment by the legislature.[4] Because the freedom is residual,[5] without the prescribed content of a right,[6] its scope may therefore change over time as the rules defining its boundaries are reconfigured to meet the shifting expectations of Australian society. In such circumstances, the best gauge for the health of Australia’s constitutional democracy is not the extent to which the freedom has been left intact, but rather the propriety of the compromises between policy interests that are reflected in those rules that constrain it.

This essay will consider the treatment by the High Court of a policy interest to which particular attention has been devoted in recent times: the protection of the workplace from interference.[7] For the most part, laws enacted in pursuit of this object have come in response to an intensification of on-site environmental activism, often affecting the resources sector.[8] Brown v Tasmania (‘Brown’) saw a successful challenge to such legislation, with provisions of the Workplaces (Protection from Protesters) Act 2014 (Tas) (‘Protesters Act’) held invalid for impermissibly burdening the implied freedom of political communication.[9] However, the question has since surfaced in other contexts. In Clubb v Edwards (‘Clubb’) and Preston v Avery (‘Preston’),[10] heard together, the Court upheld Victorian and Tasmanian legislation establishing ‘access zones’ around abortion clinics within which protests were heavily restricted. While the protection of the workplace was not as focal as it had been in Brown, clear parallels between the cases nonetheless make the opposite outcomes noteworthy. To further investigate the reasons for the disparity, a comparison of the decisions will be undertaken in Part II of this essay. Part III will then address the implications of the differences for the enactment of future laws protecting the workplace from protest. Ultimately, it is suggested that such laws ought to be drafted in a manner sensitive to their potential discriminatory effect, the importance of the site of the workplace, and the possibility that additional non-commercial concerns might support legislative intervention.

II Comparing the Cases

The comparison of Brown and Clubb hereinafter undertaken proceeds in three sections, each devoted to a factor distinguishing the cases. It may be noted at the outset that this exercise does not require discussion of the use of structured proportionality as an analytical tool by a majority of the Court on each occasion.[11]

Extent of burden in practice

The central point of distinction between Brown and Clubb was the extent of the burden on political communication occasioned by the practical operation of the legislation in each case.[12] Looking first to Brown, the plurality comprising Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ, along with Gageler and Nettle JJ writing in separate judgments, found the Protesters Act to have an effect on political communication far exceeding that required to protect the workplace from damage or disruption.

The plurality commenced by noting the vagueness of the terms ‘business premises’ and ‘business access area’, which set the geographical scope of the key provisions of the Protesters Act.[13] Compounding this issue of uncertainty, the power to enforce these provisions was conferred in broad terms — a fact given especial emphasis by Gageler and Nettle JJ.[14] Police officers could direct protesters to leave an area upon the formation of a reasonable, though potentially mistaken,[15] belief as to the existence or prospect of a contravention.[16] The direction could extend to all members of a group,[17] and disobedience would amount to an offence carrying severe penalties.[18] In all three judgments it was acknowledged that, as a result of these uncertain terms and broad discretions, the Act was likely to have an excessive, collateral effect on forms of protest that posed no risk of damage or disruption.[19]

The legislation considered in Clubb and Preston was markedly different. Neither statute was afflicted with the uncertainty noted in Brown — instead, each prohibited certain listed acts[20] within a clearly-defined 150-metre radius from premises where terminations were provided.[21] Gordon J considered that, because the Reproductive Health (Access to Terminations) Act 2013 (Tas) (‘Reproductive Health Act’) in Preston prohibited only protests ‘in relation to termination’,[22] its burden on the implied freedom was insubstantial and indirect.[23] Similarly, Nettle J regarded the burden of the Victorian and Tasmanian legislation as quantitatively slight,[24] as the affected protests concerned personal, not political, matters: the protesters merely sought to dissuade women from accessing the services of the clinics.[25] On the other hand, Gageler J emphasised the disproportionate effect of the Reproductive Health Act on pro-life protesters[26] in identifying a burden that was ‘direct, substantial and discriminatory’ — ‘not qualitatively different’ from the burden in Brown.[27] Edelman J likewise emphasised ‘human experience’ in finding the Reproductive Health Act to cause a ‘deep’ burden in its targeting of pro-life protesters.[28]

The plurality, again comprising Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ, followed the line of Nettle and Gordon JJ, describing the legislation as ‘viewpoint neutral’[29] and non-discriminatory.[30] Notably, in Brown, the same plurality had described the Protesters Act as discriminatory because it applied specifically to protesters.[31] ‘Discrimination’ was therefore approached at two different levels: in Brown, it divided protesters and non-protesters; in Clubb and Preston, it divided pro-choice protesters and pro-life protesters. This reflects the distinction recognised elsewhere between discrimination against political communication generally, and discrimination against a particular viewpoint.[32] However, under this framework, the law in Preston would have been discriminatory in the former sense, as it too singled out protest.[33] The difference is otherwise explicable if ‘discrimination’ is taken to refer to the unequal treatment of groups equally responsible for the problem that the legislation purports to solve:[34] in Brown, non-protesters could just as easily disrupt forest operations,[35] while in Clubb and Preston protesters were the sole concern.[36]

Evidence of effectiveness of protests

In Clubb, the plurality explicitly distinguished the case from Brown by reference to the importance of the protests in each case to the broader political objectives asserted by the plaintiffs.[37] In Brown, the Protesters Act severely diminished the effectiveness of on-site protests against forest operations, which were accepted to be the ‘primary means’[38] of drawing public attention to the destruction of the environment.[39] By contrast, no evidence was adduced by Mrs Clubb or Mr Preston to demonstrate that protests outside abortion clinics were the most effective means by which to communicate an anti-abortion stance for political purposes.[40] The comments of the plurality were echoed in the judgments of Nettle and Gordon JJ.[41] However, Gageler J dismissed the significance of the distinction,[42] and Edelman J considered the point unpersuasive, as media coverage of protests outside abortion clinics was restricted by prohibitions on recording set by the same legislation.[43]

Interest protected

A second and ‘more important’ point of distinction explicitly recognised by the plurality in Clubb was that the on-site protests in Brown ‘did not involve an attack upon the privacy and dignity of other people’.[44] This seems to suggest that the ‘human rights’[45] interest promoted by the access zone legislation was to be accorded more weight than the commercial interest underlying the legislation in Brown.[46] This explicit ranking of legislative purposes was not repeated by the other members of the Court.[47]

III Implications

The factors motivating the different outcomes in Brown and Clubb offer several lessons for the drafters of future anti-protest laws. The most straightforward of these tells against combining vague definitions with a discretionary enforcement mechanism. Though neither vagueness[48] nor discretion in enforcement[49] will prove fatal where a challenge is brought on the implied freedom of political communication, the bright-line rules considered in Clubb offer a safer alternative. So much is apparent, too, from Levy v Victoria (‘Levy’),[50] where the Court unanimously upheld regulations employing a strict yet simple formula comparable to that in Clubb: a geographical zone of operation was defined, unlicensed entry into the zone was prohibited, and a penalty was set for contravention.[51] However, if bright-line rules are to be preferred, it is important that the scope of these rules is precisely calibrated. Otherwise, the simplicity of the provisions will only make areas of overreach more striking. Regard should therefore be had to three considerations derived from the comparison of Brown and Clubb:

1. the potential for the legislation to have a discriminatory effect;
2. the connection between the affected protest movement and the site of the workplace; and
3. the ancillary, non-commercial interests that might bolster the case for protection.

The first of these considerations may seem untroublesome. If ‘discrimination’ is understood to mean the unequal treatment of equals, then it is easily avoided by broader drafting capturing all identifiable sources of the problem. For instance, in Brown, Gageler J pointed to the regulation in Levy as a facially non-discriminatory law, effecting a simple blanket prohibition on unlicensed persons entering the designated areas.[52] However, complications arise from the conclusion of Gageler and Edelman JJ in Preston that the Reproductive Health Act was discriminatory because in practice it disproportionately burdened pro-life over pro-choice protesters.[53] The critical question is whether discovering viewpoint discrimination behind the text in such a way makes the examination oppressively strict.[54] It is certainly conceivable that the regulations in Levy could have been characterised as discriminatory by this measure, given that several members of the Court recognised that the blanket prohibition on unauthorised entry would disproportionately affect protesters.[55] Indeed, the approach might see very few workplace anti-protest laws characterised as non-discriminatory at all, as their rationale is almost always the outlawing of the actions of a particular group — often of a distinct political persuasion.[56] Ultimately, while this discriminatory effect does not necessarily betoken invalidity,[57] it will invite more intense scrutiny of the restriction upon the targeted group’s ability to engage in political communication.[58] Accordingly, while the drafter might hope to avoid difficulty by utilising inclusive provisions,[59] it may be prudent to work according to the higher bar set by Gageler and Edelman JJ and devote greater attention to the impact of the proposed legislation on the targeted group. This places in focus the second consideration listed above: the connection between the protest and the site of the workplace.

It is increasingly common for the modern protest movement to target both the business or institution (as perpetrator) and the State (as enabler).[60] This partial shift away from a more traditional preoccupation with the State alone[61] elevates the importance of the physical place of work — an activist group will scarcely find a more apt space for protest than the site of the condemned conduct. It might be supposed, then, that the exclusion of protesters from the vicinity of certain workplaces will severely impair the ability of the group to engage in this contemporary dual-target political communication.[62] However, a further subtlety must be taken into account. The implied freedom protects only political communication;[63] there is no protection for communication relating purely to private business or institutional activity.[64] A distinction must therefore be drawn between protests targeting only the affairs of the workplace and political protests that use the workplace setting as a rhetorical device — the two extremes of a spectrum along which the political content of a workplace protest crescendos.[65] Brown offers a ready example of the latter extreme, with Dr Brown seeking to bolster a political point by depicting in film the operations in the forest coupe.[66] Clubb illustrates the former, as Mrs Clubb’s approaching a couple accessing an abortion clinic related almost exclusively to the affairs of the clinic in giving effect to a private health decision.[67] Between these poles lies the conduct of Ms Hoyt, the second plaintiff in Brown, and of Mr Preston, both directing a political point to the workplace itself.[68]

In taking action to shield workplaces from protest movements, the drafter is best advised to isolate the political content of the demonstrations under consideration and assess whether that specific content might be communicated as effectively elsewhere. Where the site is leveraged for its rhetorical value,[69] or has some other property enhancing the political communications there made — for instance, its tendency to bring opposing viewpoints together in an environment conducive to discourse[70] — the ability to protest in meaningful proximity to the schwerpunkt may be a condition of validity[71] Otherwise, the group discriminated against in the legislation might simply be required to demonstrate elsewhere.[72] In Mr Preston’s case, for instance, the essential political content was the material displayed on the placards and pamphlets,[73] elevated by the disharmony between his message and his proximity to the clinic. However, the need for additional paraphernalia made clear that the setting itself was not used as the focal communication, and so exclusion from the location imposed a less severe burden.

Also properly factored into the scope of the restrictions is the third consideration — non-commercial interests that might affect the case for protection. Instructive here is the relative weight attributed by the plurality in Clubb to the person’s dignity and privacy over the commercial interest in non-interference with the workplace. This ranking of legislative ends is clearly sound: the dignity of the person is a cardinal value of democratic society,[74] and corporations have never enjoyed the same suite of protections as the individual at law.[75] However, it ought not be pushed too far. Policy interests are far from perfectly commensurable, and it would be rash to assume that anti-protest legislation will invariably have a better case for validity where its purpose draws on something akin to human rights rather than ‘business rights’.[76] On the other hand, however, burdening the freedom of political communication for purely commercial reasons is fraught.[77] The better position, then, is that a bona fide[78] human end to the legislation might buttress any commercial objective, increasing the extent to which the freedom of political communication can permissibly be curtailed. For example, the material supporting the Summary Offences and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2019 (Qld) fixates on the danger to health and safety caused by locking devices used in environmental protests alongside the attendant business cost of the protests.[79]

IV Conclusion

This essay has considered the implications of the contrasting decisions in Brown and Clubb for the enactment of future laws concerning protests that affect workplaces. Ultimately, it is suggested that the scope of these laws ought to be set in a manner sensitive to their potential discriminatory effect, the importance of the site of the workplace to the targeted protest group, and any non-commercial concerns that might support legislative intervention. Approaching the matter in such a way ensures the propriety of the compromise between policy interests captured in the final provisions, in turn making certain that government interference with the liberties of the people is well justified.

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APLA Ltd v Legal Services Commissioner of New South Wales (2005) 224 CLR 322

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Cox v Louisiana, 379 US 536 (1965)

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Murphy v Electoral Commissioner (2016) 261 CLR 28

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Criminal Code Amendment (Prevention of Lawful Activity) Bill 2015 (WA)

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E International instruments

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F Parliamentary materials

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G Internet materials

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